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"The problem that the South now presents, 11 asserted Walter 
Hines Page in an Atlantic Monthly article in 1902, "has at last become 
so plain that thoughtful men no longer differ about it. It is no longer 
obscured by race differences nor by political differences. It is simply 
the training of the untrained masses." Education, Page was sure, 
would build a new "democratic order of society" in the South, would, 
as he had asserted in a famous 1897 speech, 11develop the forgotten 
man • . .  , The neglected people will rise," he went on, "and with 
them will rise all the people. 11 
What are we to make of Page's glorious hopes? Were they 
merely the pious pronouncements of a Progressive phrasemonger, or 
did his predict.ions reflect reality? There was, to be sure, a massive 
increase in Southern educational expenditures in the South during the 
so-called "Progressive Era." But how equitably were the funds 
distributed and what explains the pattern of distribution? Did the new 
monies go primarily to the "forgotten men and women, '1 black and 
white, mainly to the upper and middle classes, or were they divided 
equally among all classes? Was ·the creed of the Southern educational 
crusade '1equality of opportunity in the school for all, black and white," 
as the chief historian of the movement, Charles W. Dabney, put it? 
Or did the campaigns for education lead to greater inequality, to 
discrimination in the distribution of funds which was, in Louis Harlan's 
phrase, "almost universal, flagrant, and. increasing?" 1 Moreover, 
how did elimination from the electorate of large numbers of lower-class 
whites, as well as practically all the blacks, effect the allocation of 
2 
educational funds? Were Progressive politicians and "educational 
statesmen11 so committed to equality of opportunity that they not only 
extended schooling for the sons and daughters of participants in politics 
but also for the children of the disfranchised? 
2 Or could public 
schooling be paid for oniy in the pra"per democratic currency -- the 
ballot? Furthermore, how did the curtailment of party competition 
effect the apportionment of educational services? Did the decline of 
partisan debate free educationists to pursue the rhetorically popular 
goal of better education for all,· or at least for all whites? Or did 
one-party domination allow the Democratic party elite to ignore the 
claims on public services of the unorganized? Was politics, in 
Charles W, Dabney's words, "the curse of our public educati.on system," 
the removal of v.·hich would, he presumed, lead to educational progress? 
Or, on the other hand, was V, 0, Key correct in asserting that, at 
least 11over the long run," otthe have-nots lose" in a political system 
without organized parties? Finally, several political scientists, most 
notably Thomas R. Dye, have recently advanced a general economic 
and social determinist hypothesis to explain variations in such political 
''outputs'' as public education •. Simply stated, Dye's view is that the 
socioeconomic structure directly or indirectly determines the levels 
and perhaps the distribution (Dye is not so categorical on this point) 
of public services. Permutations of such characteristics of the 
political structure as turnout and party competition according to the 
dyed-in-the-wool proponents of this hypothesis, have no independent 
influence upon public policy. 4 
The paper I am presenting here today will summarize the 
first fruits of a very large quantitative study of education in the eleven 
ex-Confederate states from 1880 to 1910, a study addressed primarily 
to the rhetorical questions and hypotheses just outlined. Let me 
emphasize at the outset the tentativeness of my conclusions and 
underscore the incompleteness of the data. analyzed to this 'point, 
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Although I had planned to present results here based on an analysis of 
several states, the task proved so massive -- the computer and I have 
been manipulating matrices containing about 15, 000 separate correlation 
coefficients for one state alone -- that I was able to complete the 
analysis only for North Carolina. It was, of course, not by chance that 
I picked North Carolina to focus on first. The birthplace of Page, 
Dabney, and such other famous educational reformers as Edwin A. 
Alderman and Charles D. Mciver, and the home of the foremost 
Southern Progressive '1educational governor, '1 Charles Brantley Aycock, 
North Carolina has also been perhaps the favorite state of Southern 
historians, Developments' in education in North Carolina in the.early 
20th century were broadcast throughout the region and even the nation 
at the time, and have since been studied intensively by Edgar W, Knight 
and Charles W. Dabney, both of whose conclusions were revised by 
Louis R. Harlan, 5 Many other ·works of biography and political history. 
also treat the evolution of education in North Carolina. North Carolinians 
also -- and this, to a clin1etrician, is perhaps the most important 
consideration -- kept the best educational statistics during this period, 
Consequently, although future analysis may prove the North Carolina 
data untypical of the South as a whole, the experience of that state 
will remain undeniably crucial to any interpretation of the politics of 
Southern education in the late 19th century and early 20th century. 
BefJJre scrutinizing the �orth Caroli.na educational statistics, 
however, let me explain more fully fhe hypotheses to be tested and 
briefly review the appropriate scholarly literature. 
Two previously unconnected scholarly fields are relevant to 
the history of Southern education in this period: educational history and 
the public policy sub-field of political science. The first, educational 
history, was until lately a bastard offspring unacknowledged by either 
disciplinary relative, With the exceptions of the works of Horace Mann 
Bond in the thirties and Harlan in the fifties, Southern educational 
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histories of the Progressive period have been mostly inbred, in-house 
encomiums, charting the epic battles of lonely, enlightened educati.onal 
knights-errant {usually state school superintendents) against the dark 
forces of the masses' ig�orance, th� politicians' greed, the conservatives' 
blind negativism. The educationists' successes were the triumphs of 
enlightened leadership, victories for "the people" by their betters. 
No selfish interest groups, no social coalitions, no class demands 
infested the crusaders' camp in these histories. More money for 
education was almost always better, no matter how it was distributed. 
The typical narrative of the period from 1880 to 1910 in one 
_of these histories, say, Knight on North Carolina, Heatwole or Buck 
on Virginia, or Orr on Georgia, would go son1ething like this: 
Reconstruction produced a reaction against public education among most 
Southern whites. Resuscitated by noble, far-sighted superintendents, 
the educational systems struggled to survive against hostility and in­
difference for two and a half decades. Southern poverty and memories 
of the allegedly high taxes of Reconstruction kept school appropriations 
meager. The prosperity.of the new century, the disfranchisement of 
the blacks �- which ended the·possibility of a return to Reconstruction 
and thereby diminished the fear that taxes would be, in Southern 
Democratic eyes, misspent --, and the campaigns of a new generation 
of cosmopolitan, progressive leaders gave Southerners both the 
resources to finance education more adequately and the will to use 
them. 6 
If the standard ed. history monographs presented the view 
from the state superintendent's off.ice, the critical works of Bond and 
Harlan scowled at the system from the one-room shack which served 
as a schoolhouse for black children. Bond's too often neglected 1934 
book, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order, 
remains the essential starting point for any study of the politics of 
education in the postbellum South. Highlighting the white county vs. 
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black belt contests over the distribution of state education funds, Bond 
pictured blacks as little more than pawns in the battle, at least after 
the end of Reconstruction robbed them of what he termed 11any real 
political power." Black belt whites in Mississippi and Alabama, Bond 
pointed out, managed to push through the legislature laws virtually 
inviting local school boards to discriminate racially in the allocation of 
funds,' At the same time, leg
.
islators fron1 heavily Negro counties 
preserved the system of distribution of state funds to counties and 
local school districts on the basis of the total school-age population of 
both races. The two sets of laws fos�ered educational inequality not 
only by race, but also, among whites, by geographical area. Whites 
in the black belt, Bond asserted on the basis of a rather cursory 
examination of the statistics for a few counties, prospered at the 
expense of both blacks and white county whites, 
Bond's argument, a great deal of which was based chiefly on 
the single example of Alabama, rested on somewhat shaky factual 
grounds, Two decades later, Harlan buttressed Bond's general points 
with a study of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia 
from 1900 to 1915. Painstaking in his use of traditional literary sources, 
Harlan was as thorough in analyzing statistics as could be expected in the 
days before Fortran became a recognized foreign language in the profession, 
Largely on the basis of statewide statistics, data from a few extreme 
counties, ::i-nd what is usually termed "eyeball correlation, 11 Harlan 
concluded that racial inequality in .educational services increased 
during the Progressive Era in the South, that in education, as in other 
segments of Southern life, Progressivism was, in C. Vann Woodward's 
phrase, "for whites only. '1 Laying less stress than Bond had on the 
arg.ument that black-county white gains came at the expense of white-
county whites as well as blacks generally, Harlan did little more than 
Bond had to test that proposition systematically. 7 
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The second scholarly field relevant to the politics of education 
is the investigation of so-called "policy outputs" in political science. 
As with so many other topics in that discipline, this subject begins 
with some remarks by the late V, O. Key. fu his classic Southern 
Politics, Key argued that in order· to assert their interests effecti.vely 
on the state and local issues of taxation and expenditure, the have-nots 
need a stable, continuous organization -- a political party dedicated to 
lower-class interests. The impossibility of preserving such an 
organization in the one -party .20th century South, he judged, explained 
the deplorable lack of public services for the lower strata. Complicati.ng 
and undercutting this line of argument, however, Key went on to point 
out that the party struggle in western democracies has always been. a: 
battle between two or more sets of elites bidding for t11e favor of the 
electorate. The disorganized auctions betv:een constantly shifting 
bidders in a politics of faction, rather than party led to a great deal 
of impulse buying; and once purchased, the goods were often not 
delivered. 
It seems to me that these two arguments of Key's are at best 
muddled and at worst cbntradictory, and that they have bred a great 
deal of confusion in the sub�equent literature. The first sees the 
have-nots achieving their class aims through a single lower-class 
dominated party -- a socialist or quasi-socialist party. Competition 
from another party is necessary chiefly so that the aims of the class 
party don't get diluted. It is the presence of a class party, not the 
presence of party competition, that is most crucial. Since there are 
alway.s more have-nots than haves, the lower-class party will often 
achieve its aims. The second argument, on the other hand, focuses 
purely on competition and views voters as calculating decision-makers 
who merely sell their votes to whichever opportunistic elite offers the 
more appealing package of public services. This second, bargaining 
model, is, as William Riker and his students have recently shown, 
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much less deterministic in its predictions. In the bargaining model, 
in other words, party competition may lead to either a reduction or an 
increase in the levels of public services. Wealth may be redistributed 
from the top to the bottom, from the bottom to the top, or not at all. 9 
Although he put less stress on it than on the party competition p'oi.nt, 
Key also clearly believed that the less members of the lower-class 
voted, other things being equal, the lower the level of public services 
for them would be. Operationally, he assumed that non-lower-class 
voters always voted in constant proportions and that the overall 
turnout level was therefore purely a !unction of lower-class turnout. 
Subsequent work in political science has not done much to 
10 clarify Key's confusion on the party competition point. In their 
attempts to test Key's assertions by using them to try to explain 
differences in the levels of public expenditures across An1erican 
cities and states, and, more recently, across countries, political 
scientists have made two crucial, and, I think, incorrect assumptions. 
First, they assumed that if they could show that differences in party 
con1petition across geographical units were not positively associated 
\\'ith higher levels of public services, then they had proved that party 
competition had no effect. This is simply a nonsequitur. If the "clci.ss 
party'1 version of the party competition argument is to be tested, the 
relevant independent variable is a necessarily subjective qualitative 
judgment about the presence or absence of a class-dominated party. 
On the other hand, the bargaining model, in the present stage of 
political theory, leads to no firm predictions about public expenditure 
levels at all. Neither variant can be tested by simply throwing an 
interval-level party competition index into the right-hand side of a 
regression equation. The second incorrect assumption made by many 
of the political scientists is that public service �were adequate 
proxies for the distribution of public services. But the fact that the 
level of spending for highways or education was higher in one state 
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than another does not imply that the services- in the former state 
redistributed wealth more than those in the latter. Recognizing this 
difficulty, a few political scientists have attempted, unsuccessfully, 
I believe, to confront it by estimating the redistributiv-e impact of 
certain public service·s. Others liave. simp�y begu??- to add another 
qualification to their generalizations. lO 
Drawing on the scholarly \Vorks reviewed, statements of 
turn-of the century educators, and my own previous work in Southern 
politics during this era, let me lay out four rather informal models 
for examination. I will refer to them, in turn, as 
l. the Progressive model; 
2, the Progressivism-for-whites-only, or, for 
short, the "whites only" model; 
3. the Progressivism-for -middle-class -whites -
only or "middle-class" model; 
and, 4. the economic determinist model. 
Each will be tested against data for the state as a whole and for each 
county collected from the series of North Carolina State Superintendent 
and State Auditors' reports.for each five year interval from 1880 to 
1910 -- that is, for 1880, 1885, 1890, and so on. I will also include 
data on each gubernatorial election held during the period, A great 
many of the figures in this massive data set -- it contains roughly 
60, 000 pieces of information -- are separated by race, and figures 
not separated by race can often easily be estimated, 
To return to the models, the first, the Progressive model, 
is elitist. Educational progress came only when elites pushed the 
recalcitrant masses to increase school taxes. The degree of success 
of such campaigns was contingent upon the degree of prosperity. As 
one of the foremost educational. reformers, Charles W. Dabney, put 
it, " • . .  the poverty of the people is the immediate cause why the 
schools are so poor, • • •  Where education is heeded most is just 
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where the people do not appreciate it and will not exert themselves to 
provide it. It is not to be expected that a poor people will tax themselves 
for schools, • 11 Fortunately for the poor, the leaders were 
benevolent, and the increased benefits were distributed in an 
increasingly equitable fashion, for blacks as well as whites, As 
Heat ":"ole, speaking of Virginia, asserted, the Progressive Era was one 
of "educational progress remarkable, if not phenomenal, in the line 
of democratizing education. , • .  " And with regard to North Carolina, 
Knight asserted that Governor Charles B. Aycock believed in 
'' 1educating everybody and educating everyth ing , ' This creed made 
him the Negro's best and most active educational advocate. 11 �3 We 
may derive four predictions from the Progressive version of 
educational history: 
1. Before the onset of the educational campaign, local school 
tax rates should have been lower in poor counties than in rich counties, 
Z. Increases in wealth shoud have been strongly and 
positively associated with increases in educational expenditures. 
3 & 4. Educational expenditures should have been more 
equitably distributed among whites, and among both blacks and whites 
after 1900 than before, 
The ''Progressivism for whites onlytt model, derived primarily 
from Bond, Harlan, and Key, clashes with the Progressive description 
of events at nearly every point .. According to Bond, blacks and poor 
whites believed education crucial to improving their social and 
economic status, and showed, especially during Reconstruction, that 
they were willing to sacrifice a good deal for it. The decline of black 
political power, however, reduced that group's ability to demand 
educational equality. 
14 
The marks of the decrease in Afro-American 
political power were the withering away of black voting and the waning 
of the political party to which they chiefly adhered in the 19th century, 
the GOP. Since poor whites, according to this theory, were not 
JO 
disfranchised, they could secure a relatively fair share in the 
Progressive Era increases in educational expenditures. 15 The "whites 
only!! argument, then, yields four propositions: 
1. Even before the Progressive Era, tax rates should have 
been higher in the poorer than in richer areas. 
2. Educational expenditures for blacks should have declined, 
relative to those for whites, after blacks were disfranchised and 
Republican party fortunes ebbed. 
3. The relative black declines should have been directly 
related to declines in black turnout and in Republican strength. 
4, The distribution of white educational expenditures shoUld 
have remained roughly constant over the whole period from 1880 to 
1910.16 
The "Progressivism for middle class whites only" hypothesis 
has two variants: the first, Bond's and Harlan1s; the second, growing 
out of Key's work, my own, Bond asserted that laws allowing black 
belt whites to divert state school funds from the education of black to 
the education of white children, coupled with the growth in state 
educational allocations and with restrictions on local taxation, led to 
an increasing inequality in per capita expenditures among whites. 
The black belt gained at the expense of the white counties. While 
agreeing with Bond and Harlan on that point, I would also expect that 
declines in white turnout and in the strength of lower-class-oriented 
political parties led to additional inequities among whites. As I have 
argued in my recent book, upper-class Democrats from black-majority 
areas instituted changes in the political structure in the turn-of-the -
century South in order to disfranchise many poor whites as well as 
almost all blacks, and to discourage political parties responsive to 
� group. A decline in lower class white political power, like the 
decline in black power, should have led to a decline in the public 
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services that class received. The "middle class" argument leads, 
therefore, to two separate propositions: 
I. Bond and Harlan would argue that white educational 
expenditures per white child should have been strongly related to the 
percentage of Negroes in a county only after the legal changes 
encouraged racial discrimination in black belt areas, 
Z. I would hypothesize, in addition, that changes in white 
expenditure levels should have been associated with changes in white 
turnout as well as in the party fortunes of the two North Carolina 
parties most responsive to lower class white voters, the Populists 
and Republicans. 
Finally, the socioeconomic determinist model serve's as a 
general null hypothesis to each of the other theories. Since its 
proponents assume, in effect, that the taste for taxes and service 
levels is a function only of other socioeconomic variables, we should 
expect to find, first, that tax rates were roughly constant everywhere·. 
Second, expenditure levels should have been correlated highly ·with 
wealth, and changes in each should aslo have been strongly related. 
Third, any changes in the distribution of expenditures by race across 
counties should reflect only changes in the underlying socioeconomic 
structure. To the determinist, laws simply mirror the currently 
existing social structure rather than themselves producing immediate 
social change. Consequently, the legal alte·rations which Bond and 
Harlan beiieved led to discrimi'nation in educational expenditures in 
favor of black belt whites should have had no effect. The fourth 
prediction of the determinist model is, therefore, that the relation 
between expenditure levels and the percentage of Negroes in each 
county should have remained roughly constant over time. 
Let us turn now from expositing the models to examining the 
data, The Progressive contention that the denizens of poor areas were 
less anxious for an education than their wealthier counterparts appears 
lZ 
to be wrong. Pearsonian correlation coefficients between wealth per 
adult male and the percentages of wealth paid in taxes on property 
and polls in each county can be computed for 1880, 1890, and 1905 for 
North Carolina. For 1880, long before the educational campaign, and 
for 1905, during the c:ampaign, the correlations between wealth per 
adult male and the tax rate by county were slightly negative, but not 
significantly different from zero at the . 05 level. The 1890 correlations 
are much more interesting, since for that date the state published both 
wealth and taxes paid separately for each race. In 1890, the correlation 
between white wealth per white adult male and the white tax rate by 
county was -. 625, and the analogous coefficient for blacks was -, 653. 17 
The tax statistics, in sum, not only tend to refute the elitist argu:ni.ent, 
they also cast doubt on the determinist contention that the taste for 
education and taxes was everywhere constant. 
The regressivity of the tax structure should astonish few. 
But how inequitably distributed was the quality of education those taxes 
bought? Unfortunately, this question poses two severe difficulties: 
how to measure quality, and how to measure maldistribution. For the 
first, I have chosen to Concentrate on expenditures for teachers' 
salaries, and, for the years from 1880 to 1910, for schoolhouses and 
18 
sites. No other figures provide a full series of quality-related 
measures which are comparable across counties. 
19 
I chose to 
divide these expenditures by the number of children in each race 
between 6 and 21 given in the school censuses, rather than by the 
enrollment or average daily attendance because the rates of 
enrollment and attendance were undoubtedly somewhat dependent upon 
the quality of the education offered by the schools. Before the passage 
of compulsory attendance laws, the worse·the schools, the less likely 
one would have been to enroll one's child, and the less likely that child 
would have been to attend. Normalizing expenditures by enrollment 
or attendance would, consequently, compound the difficulty of interpreting 
13 
the dependent variable. To measure the degree of racial discrimination 
by county, I sin1ply formed the ratio of the expenditure divided by 
population for each race. The higher what I shall call the "racial 
discrimination ratio," the better treated blacks were, relative to 
whites , ZO 
The statewide trends in expenditure per child for blacks, 
whites, and the ratio between them given in Table 1 are clear enough, 
Whites and blacks shared poverty relatively equally until 1900, after 
which the white increases far outdistanced those for Negroes , The 
variations bet\veen counties were not so stable, however, as the 
colurn.ns listing the coefficients of variability indicate. School monies 
were sometimes distributed fairly evenly from county to county, as 
in 1900, but sometimes much less evenly, as in 1890. The statewide 
figures may, therefore, mask developments at the local level. 
Tables 2 and 3 indicate trends in the economic and political 
va riables. Wealth per white adult male -- and the rates and methods 
of assessing that wealth -- were pretty constant from 1880 to 1900, after which 
assessed wealth, along with expenditures for white children, mushroomed. 
This makes a prima faciae case for economic determinism. Changes 
in the political figures, indicated in Table 3, trace a somewhat more 
subtle pattern. White turnout was very high through 1900, after which 
it slumped off by fifteen to twenty percent. Black turnout percentages 
were quite comparable to \.vhite, in some elections, and lower, though 
still approximately hvo thirds of the eligibles, through 1896. The 
1900 figure is very suspect because of quite extensive ballot box 
stuffing, but I estimate that almost no Negroes voted in North 
after 1900. The disfranchisement of blacks and the mortal wounds 
administered to the Populist and Republican parties came at the same 
time as the increase in discrimination against blacks in the distribution 
of educational funds. Any changes in the distribution of expenditures 
among whites might be accounted for by the trends in white turnout 
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and the decline of parties responsive to the white lower class. That 
Tables 2 and 3 make cases for economic determinism on the one hand 
and political determinism on the other implies that we must move down 
to the county level to reach more definite conclusions. 
Table 4 sum':rnarizes se�en linear regression equations in 
which the dependent variable for each county was the expenditure per 
child for whites and the independent variables were white wealth per 
adult male, the percentage Negro, and estimated white turnout, 2 1
Looking at the equations a s  a whole, we find them quite good 
predictors, usually explaining nearly half of the variance in the 
dependent variable. The F tests show that all the equations predic� 
better than chance at the . 05 level. Examining the individual 
coefficients, we notice first that wealth was always significantly 
related to expenditure. Before conceding the game to the determinists, 
however, let us consider the pattern of relationships in the third 
column. If the percentage of Negroes in each county \.Vere related to 
educational expenditures merely because it was an indicator of a social 
structure which was more hierarchical in heavily-Negro areas, more 
democratic in the mountai�s, then one would expect the coefficients to 
remain pretty much the same , If, however, one considers the Bond-
Harlan argument that black belt whites could prosper by discriminating 
against Negroes only when the laws allowed them to, and that tho.se 
laws could only be passed after black political power diminished, one 
would predict almost exactly the pattern which column three of Table 
4 presents: the coefficient.is first significantly negative, then 
insignificant and finally strongly positive. The percentage Negro ought 
therefore to be considered not a socioeconomic variable at all, but a 
proxy for statewide political trends. 
zz 
The fourth column lends little 
support to the argument that politicians penalized disfranchised whites 
by disregarding them in the allocation of public expenditures. Only 
two of the coefficients are significant, and they both have the wrong sign. 
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Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results of seven regression 
analogous to those in Table 4, but this time using the expenditure per 
black child and the racial discrimination ratio as dependent variables 
and deleting coefficients not significantly different from zero. 23 In 
general, these equations are poorer predictors than the regressions 
for whites, having significant explanatory power in only half of the 
fourteen possible cases. The pattern of the racial discrimination 
ratios, however, was almost exactly what the "Progressivism for 
whites only" model predicted, Before 1900, there \Vas no more 
discrimination in the allocation of fi.inds against Negroes in the black 
areas than anywhere else. After _1900, racial discrimination increased 
directly with the percentage of Negroes in each county (a higher 
"R. D.R." signifies less discrimination). Note, also, the two signi­
ficant coefficients in column three. The revitalized Republicans and 
the Populists apparently rewarded their black constituents in 1895 
with more a equitable distribution of funds. Had these two anti-racist 
parties been able to maintain their 1895 strength, instead of being 
overthro\vn in the vicious 1898 "white supremacy campaign" alld 
devastated by the subsequent disfranchisement laws, the tremendous 
growth in racial discrimination during the Progressive Era might 
have been avoided. The 1910 coefficient reflects the fact that the 
Democrats discriminated against blacks considerably more than did 
the party· of Lincoln, even allowing for variations in wealth and the 
N . h 24 percentage egro in eac county. 
While superior to a simple presentation of statewide averages, 
the variations in expenditure per child by county do not represent quite 
adequately the change in patterns of distribution of expenditures. 
What we need are measures which summarize statewide trends in 
distribution without ignoring the county-by-county differences. Table
7 is based on a series of Lorentz inequality curves, that is, curves 
which Plot the cumulative percentage of expenditures on the abscissa 
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and the cumulative percentage of population on the ordinate of a 
coordinate system, U expenditures were distributed equally to 
everyone, one percent of the population would get one percent of the 
expenditures, two per�ent would get two percent, etc., in which case 
the points would all fall on a line drawn at a 45 degree angle to each
axis. The Lorentz curve tracing the actual cumulative pei-centages 
is a measure of the deviation from the equality of the 45 degree line, 
and the Gini coefficient given. in column 1 of Table 7 is proportional 
to the area between the Lorentz curve and the 45 degree line. The 
higher the Gini coefficient, which varies from zero to one, the greater 
the inequality. The other four columns in the Table give selected· 
points on the Lorentz curve, and have more natural interpretations than 
the Gini. If one ranks all counties by white expenditure per child, 
the lowest third of the counties got about 22% of the expenditures in 
1880, the bottom half got 37%, and so on. 
The particular figures show that the inequality of expenditures 
for whites reached a minimum in 1895, after which it increased 
significantly, The distribution for the whole population was almost 
exactly the same as the dist'ribution for v:hites alone through 1900, 
which indicates that there was little purely racial discrimination up 
to that time, After 1900, inequality for the whole population increased 
more than inequality for whites alone, reflecting the greater degree of 
racial discrimination after the turn of the century. 
But what relation did this growing inequality in expenditures 
bear to the economic structure? It is not inconsistent with the pattern 
of Lorentz curves that the expenditures could have been distributed 
less equally after 1900, but that the distribution increasingly favored 
the poor at the expense of the rich. That the figures do reflect growing 
class as well aS racial inequality is proved graphically in Figures 
and 2. The numbers which the free-hand curves in Figure 2, for 
example, sketch were generated by first ranking every county by white 
wealth per white male adult and then cumulating the percentages of 
\vealth held by whites from the poorest up to the richest county. 
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then cun1ulated the percentages of educational expenditures on whites 
for each county, rank-ordered by per capita wealth, and plotted the 
hvo cumulative percentages against each other. If expenditures were 
distributed exactly in proportion to wealth, the curves would all 
coincide with a 45 degree line. But they do not. Expenditures for 
education were much more equally distributed than wealth, even after 
1900. As Figure l strikingly demonstrates, however, there was a 
massive shift in distribution between 1895 and 1910, In the earlier 
year, blacks, who held but 3. 2% of total \Vealth, got 35 , 3% of the 
expenditures. The blacks and poor whites who held 40% of the wealth 
got 53% of the expenditures. By 1910, however, there had been a 
large shift in expenditures away from the poor. Blacks in 1910 got only 
16. 7% of the expenditures, less than half of their 1895 expenditures, 
The bottom 40% of blacks and whites received about 48% of the total, 
or about 5% less than they had during the era of the Populist-Republican 
Fusion government. That this reflected not only racial discrimination, 
but class differentials among whites is demonstrated by Figure 2. 
Movement from the middle line, based on 1895 data for white wealth 
and white expenditures per child, to the bottom line, based on 1910 
figures, reflects a growing bias against the po.or whites in the 
distribution pf benefits, although !ess of a gulf than between whites 
and blacks. 
The burgeoning expenditures of the Progressive Era, then, 
were inequitably distributed -- biased against poor whites, and even 
more biased against the blacks. Unable to protect themselves at the 
polls, robbed of the shelter provided by sympathetic political parties, 
and incapable, therefore, of prevailing upon the legislature to repeal 
laws which favored the wealthy whites in the black belt counties at the 
expense of- both Negroes and poor hill country whites, the lower-class 
18 
could only watch helplessly as they fell educationally further and 
further behind the middle and upper class whites who supported, and 
benefited most from, the so-called Progressive movement. 
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FIGURE 1: Cumulative Percent of Wealth on Horizontal Axis, 
Cumulative Percent of Expenditures 
(Blacks and Whites Separated) on the Vertical Axis, 
Both Ordered by Increasing Wealth Per Male Adult 
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FIGURE 2: Cumulative Percent of Wealth on Horizontal Axis, 
Cumulative Percent of Expenditures 
(Whites Only) on the Vertical Axis, Both Ordered 
by Increasing Wealth Per White Male Adult 
Year 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
Year 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
* 
TABLE 1: STATEWIDE STATISTICS ON EDUCATION 
IN NOR TH CAROLINA 
ExEenditure/PoEulation Coefficient of Variability 
:< 
White � RDR White Black 
$0. 7Z $0. 74 I. 03 o. 37 0.37 
l. 07 I. 12 ], 05 0. 36 0.65 
1. 13 o. 97 0. 86 0.65 o. 70 
1. 21 1. 06 0. 88 o. 32 0.32 
I. 48 I. 06 o. 72 o. 38 o. 31 
z. 21 1. 24 o. 56 0.34 o. 38 
3.26 1. 39 0,43 0.45 0.44 
* Coefficient of Variability = standard deviation/mean, 
measured for all counties 
TABLE 2: COUNTY MEANS: ASSESSED WEALTH AND 
ESTIMATES OF WEALTH IN NORTH CAROLINA 
RDR 
0,40 . 
0.12 
o. 80 
2. 35 
0,37 
o. 54 
o.67 
\Vhi.te Wealth 
Per Adult :Ma.le 
Black Wealth 
Per Adult Male 
$ 779. 18* 
873. 30* 
860. 48 (851. 04 ''I 
813. 02 (814. 20""1 
883. 08 (884, 46 *) 
1215. 59* 
1938. 37* 
$ SJ. 85 
59. 78 
l 08. 22 
Asterisked figures are estimates; all others are actually separated by 
race in the original published data, The estimates were calculated by 
assuming that black adult males all held the same amount of wealth in 
each year -- $50 in 1880, $75 in 1885 and 1890, $100 in 1895 and 1900, 
$125 in 1905 and 1910. The correlations across counties between the 
estimates for whites and the actual published figures for whites in 1890 
1895, and 1900 were • 960, 
• 
997 � and . 998, and the regression coefficients 
(b1s) were all close to I. 0. 
Year 
1880 
1884 
1888 
1892 
1896 
1900 
1904 
1908 
Year 
1880 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1905 
1910 
TABLE 3' TRENDS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
GUBERNATORIA.L ELECTIONS 
% Democratic % Republican A o/o Other A Estimated Turnout B 
White 
41. 3 39. 2 0 76 
45.06 39. 2 0 79 
44.6 40. 2 o. 9 95 
37. 9 26. 5 14. l 94 
37. 5 39. 7 8. 3 85 
44,8 30. 3 o. l 80 
28. 5 17.6 o. J 63 
29. 8 22.4 o. J 68 
A -- of total adult males 
B �-for methods of estimation, please consult The ShaEing of 
Southern Politics. 
TABLE 4: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR WHITE 
EXPENDITURE/POPULATION 
Coefficients for Estimated 
R2 Constant White Wealth % Negro White Turnout 
+ .426 +. 00065 -. 598 
'� 
-. 003 .471 
+. 806 +. 00041 
�' 
-. 035 -. 019 . 154 
* + ,429 +. 00137 -. 042 -.472 • 377 
+.00060* * +. 375 +. 787 +. 141 • 571 
* ,;, +. 880 +. 00037 1.407 - • 088 
• 
459 
+ 1. 546 +. ooos8* +. 626 * - • 987 
• 
561 
* ,, * + 4. 180 +. 00088 + 1. 760 -4. 253 .490 
* Significant at • 05 level 
Black 
86 
98 
68 
64 
87 
60 
0 
0 
!".
19. 02 
4.44 
16. 35 
28. 41 
22. 93
35. 33 
26. 95 
TABLE 7: DISTRIBUTION OF EXPENDITURES PER CHILD 
TABLE 5: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR BLACK 
EXPENDITURE PER CHILD 
Year Gini Coefficient Cumulative % of Expenditures on Cumulative % of 
(Significant Coefficients Only) Population 
Year Total Wealth e:er % Negro Rz E ill. ill 3/4 9/10 
Adult Male 
a. Whites 
1880 + • 00052 - • 771 
• 285 6. 278 1880 • 19 . 22 • 37 • 66 . 82 
1905 + . 00060 - z. 153 . 283 8.089 1885 .18 • 21 • 36 . 63 . 83 
19JO - 3. 990 • 212 5. 567 1890 . 20 ·• 22 . 37 . 61 . 79 
1895 • 15 .24 • 39 • 65 • 85 
1900 . 18 • 23 • 38 . 64 • 82 
TABLE 6: REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR RACIAL 1905 .18 .23 • 37 • 63 • 83 
DISCRI1v1INAT!ON RATIO 
1910 
• 
21 .21 • 36 • 62 • 81 
(Significant Coefficients Only) 
b. Blacks & Whites 
R2 
1880 • 18 . 22 • 37 • 64 .83 
Year White Wealth % Negro % Anti- % Not E
Pe r White Democratic Voting 1885 .20 .20 • 35 • 61 .79 
Male Adult 
1890 .20 . 22 . 37 • 62 • 81 
1885 - • 00070 • 079 1. 539 1895 • 15 • 24 . 39 .65 • 85 
1895 + .  329 • 180 3. 458 1900 • 18 • 23. . 38 • 63 . 82 
1900 • 679 +, . 202 • 364 11.426 1905 • 21 . 21 • 35 • 62 
• 
82 
1905 • 960 . 432 15, 579 1910 .27 . 17 • 30 • 58 • 79 
1910 -1. 682 + . 264 . 478 19. 000 
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l. Charles W. Dabney, Universal Education in the South, 2 vols, (reprint 
ed., New York: Arno Press, 1969), vol. I, p. vii-ix; Louis R. 'Harlan, 
Separate and Unequal: Public School Campaigns and Racism in the 
Southern Seaboard States, 1901-1915 (reprint ed,, New York: Atheneum, 
1969), P• 269. 
z. For such a clain1, see Charles B. Aycock1s inaugural address, quoted 
in Edgar W. Knight, Public School Education in North Carolina (reprint 
ed., New York: Negro U11iversities Press, 1969), p. 329. 
3. Dabney, "The Public School Problem in the South, 11 in William Torrey 
Harris, Report of the Commissioner of Education for the Ye'ar 1900-1901 
(1.Vashington: G.P.0., 1902, vol, II, p. 1018; Key, Southern Politics in 
State'.and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 307. 
4. Dye, Understanding Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice­
Hall, Inc., 1972), conveniently summarizes Dye's point of view and much 
of his earlier research. 
5. See Edgar \V. Knight, Public School Education in North Carolina {reprint 
ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969, as well as the previously 
cited works of Dabney and Harlan. 
6. Edgar \V. Knight, "Some Economic, Political, and Social Influences on 
Education in the South," in W. Carson King et al., Secondary Education 
in the South (Chapel Hill, N. C,: University of North Carolina Press, 1946). 
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Co. , 1916 ), pp. 217 -365; J. L. Blair Buck, The Development of Public 
Schools in· Virginia, 1607-1952 •(Richmond: State Board of Education, 
vol. XXXV, No. 1, July, 1952), p'p. 27-273; Dorothy Orr, A History of 
Education in Georgia (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1950), pp. 18 1-343. 
7. Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social 
Order (reprint ed., New York: Octagon Press, 1966); Harlan, Separate 
and Unequal. 
8. Key, Southern Politics, pp. 298-3 1 1. 
9. 
10. 
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12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
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William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive 
Political Theory {Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc,, 
1973), Chapter 9, pp. 240-271. 
There is much too much literature on this topic for me to list here 
even a full bibliography of review articles. The best reviews is 
Richard I. Hofferbert, "State 
'
and Community Policy Studies: A 
Review of C.omparative Input-Output Analyses," Political Science 
Annual, 3 (1972), pp. 3-72. 
Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution,'' 
American Political Science Review, 64 (1970), pp. 508-522. I do 
not mean to cavil at their'attempt. I merely think their index 
inadequate and their methodology flawed. 
Dabney, in Harris, Report, pp. 1019-1020, 1013. 
Heatwole, Education in Virginia, p. 321, and Paul lvfonroe's 
introduction to Heatwole's book, pp. xiii-xiv; Knight, Education in 
North Carolina, p. 342. 
Bond, Education of the Negro, pp. 76-7, 92. Bond, Key, and 
Harlan all viewed that decline as a gradual one, accounted for by 
extra-legal disfranchisement and pretty much accomplished by about 
the early 1890s. Since, as I have shown in The Shaping of Southern 
Politics, ch. 7, North Carolina blacks continued to vote in very 
large numbers until. legally disfranchised in 1900, I \Vill discard 
their factual premise while at the san1e time accepting their more 
fundamental argument li'nking the political power of a group with 
the public services it can obtain. 
Harlan, Separate and Unequal, p. 265. 
These and other propositions may be reworked in the future to include 
both the taxing and spending sides of school programs. The proper 
dependent variable ought to be a ratio of or difference between the 
costs of and some crude measure of the benefits from education. 
But there are many difficult theoretical dilemmas to be faced in 
constructing the index: Should i.t be a ratio or a difference? How 
should wages foregone to get an education be estimated? How should 
potential returns to alternative uses of capital be taken into account? 
In addition, there is the grave practical problem that tax rates are 
seldom available by race, while those we do have by race (for 
Georgia and Virginia, for example) show both striking racial inequality 
in tax rates and disturbingly large differences in the degree of 
inequality for successive years, In sum, the usual 'problems of 
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testing human capital theories are compounded in this case, and I 
have not yet been able to work through all the difficulties, 
17. The correlation between the two \Vas +. 627, The correlations 
between the white and black tax rates and the tax rate for people of 
both races were +. 915 and +, 595, respectively, The regressiveness 
of the tax structure does not merely reflect black belt/white county 
differences. If one controls for the percentage Negro in each county, 
the partial correlation between white wealth per white adult male 
and t" white tax rate is reduced only to •. 566, while the analogous 
statistic for blacks is -. 633. I divided wealth by the number of 
adult males by race in order to approximate the wealth for each 
fan1ily, since the number of family heads in each county was 
unavailable in the. censuses. 
18, The fact that no statistics on spending for capital outlay sepa·rated by 
race are available for 1905 and 1910 undoubtedly biased downward 
my estimates of the degree of racial and perhaps of class discrimi· 
nation for those two years, for the state \vas in the midst of a mammoth 
boom in school construction, especially for whites. The average 
values of white and black schoolhouses in 1900 were $181 and $122, 
respectively; in 1910, they ·were $973 and $297. 
19. Pointing out that there was no one-to-one relationship for the 
American states in the 1960s between expenditure levels and such 
measures of public service quality as the percent failing the selective 
service examination in each state, the political scientist Ira 
Sharkansky urged students of policy outputs to employ actual service 
levels rather than indices based on expenditures as the dependent 
variables in their equations. One problen1 in the present case is that 
for the South in this period, there are no reliable state-or-region­
wide measures of quality. Another difficulty is that even where 
measures of service outputs, such as the percentage of illiteracy, 
are availa?le, they are certainly independently related to socio­
economic variables. For instance., one would expect to find a high 
correlation between illiteracy and wealth whatever the impact of 
public education was in reducing illiteracy, because wealthier 
communities would be able to provide more educational activities 
outside of formal schooling. Ira Sharkansky, "Government 
Expenditures and Public Services in the American States, 11 American 
Political Science Review. 61 (196 7), pp. 1066-1077; Sharkansky, 
The Politics of Taxing and Spending (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill 
Co., Inc.• 1969), pp. 176-198. 
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20. I have left a discussion of a great many other statistics out of this 
paper, partly for the sake of clarity, and partly for lack of time to 
perforn1 an extensive enough analysis of them, Two other leading 
candidates for measures of educational quality, the "grades" of 
teachers and various pupil/teacher ratios, performed poorly. The 
standards for classifying teachers as "first grade," ''second grade," 
and so on appear to have varied widely from county to county. The 
ubiquitous calls in the contemporary educational reports for 
consol'idation of school districts are reflected in the statistics. Tiny, 
but poverty-striken districts often had smaller ratios of the number 
of school children, the enrollment, or the average daily attendance 
to each teacher than larger,. wealthier districts. To employ the 
teacher/student ratio as a dependent variable would therefore be 
tantamount to asserting that a barely literate part-time schoolkeeper 
offered his handful of pupils a better education in a shack up in a 
hollo\v than a superior teacher who taught a larger class in a town. · 
21. White turnout was estimated on the assumption that Negroes in every 
county voted in the same proportion as they were estimated to have 
in the state as a whole, 
22. The percentage Negro apparently does not reflect county by county 
political trends, for the relationship beh>ireen it and expenditures per 
white child does not wash out if several other political vaTiables are 
introduced into the regression equations. 
23. There were four independent variables in each equation: total wealth 
per male adult, the percent! Negro, the percent of all adult males 
voting against the Democrats, and the overall percentage not voting. 
The last variable is an unsatisfactory proxy for Negro turnout, which 
can only be estimated at the state level. The operationalization is 
based, in effect, on the assumption that \Vhite turnout was constant 
across all counties and that variations in turnout were due entirely 
to differences in black voting rates from county to county. The 
significant coefficient on turnout for 1900 in Table 6 has a sign 
opposite to that predicted. The independent variable in this case, 
however, was the percent not voting in 1896, when black turnout 
levels were high. I used that figure on the assumption that there 
would have been some log between the Democratic return to power in 
1898 and the onset of discrimination, but it appears that there \\•as 
no log, I shall therefore recalculate the equation, substituting the 
1900 nonvoting figure, 
24. The results of thirty-six regressions using as dependent variables 
the changes in expenditure per child for whites, blacks, ·and the 
racial discrimination ratio between them, and the proportionate 
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changes {the changes divided by the earlier levels) in each of these 
will not be reported here. The independent variables were the 
percent Negro in the earlier year and the changes and proportionate 
changes in wealth, estimated white and overall turnout, and the 
percent voting against the Democrats, The few significant coefficients 
formed patterns similar to those shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
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